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ABSTRACT 
INVESTING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
DEMOCRACY AND/OR TRANSPARENCY 
 
This thesis examines the concept of transparency and its role in international 
investment in the developing world.  Investment is essential to developing nations 
because of its overarching economic benefits, such as new avenues of employment, 
exposure to new markets and the financing of diverse development projects.  The desire 
for increased capital from foreign investors has influenced and shaped the economic 
policies of developing democratic and autocratic states.  One of the most recent trends 
in economic policy is the formulation and adoption of transparent vehicles, such as 
access-to-information legislation, which address perceived investor risk through certain 
actions, such as publishing various economic statistics about a certain market or 
economy.  Perceived investor risk is accompanied by commitment and information 
problems when multinational corporations engage in investment negotiations with a 
developing state.  While democracy is acknowledged among scholars such as Nathan 
Jensen to alleviate the commitment problem in negotiation, the scope of this thesis 
focuses on transparency and its role in addressing the information problem in the 
facilitation of multinational foreign direct investment.  The empirical analysis shows 
that the degree of transparency is not contingent on the presence of democracy in a 
particular state and both autocratic and democratic regimes have similar advantages in 
the competition for investment.  The results also highlight the increased dependency on 
transparency vehicles by autocratic regimes because the regime itself is unable to 
counter certain facets of the commitment problem due to the lack of democratic means 
of governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of globalization has accelerated the rate of communication and 
information transfer via advances in technology and the expansion of the Internet. 
Globalization is the reduction of economic, political and cultural exchange barriers by 
technological, economic and political innovations (Drezner 2001: 200).  Undoubtedly, 
globalization has united the world economy and created vast networks of business 
spanning across national borders.  As a result, new economic opportunities are 
surfacing around the world through the connection of producers to foreign distributors, 
assemblers to foreign suppliers and investing firms to potential host nations (Rauch & 
Trindade 2003: 775). 
The aforementioned economic opportunities are created in the international 
economy through investment ventures facilitated by private firms.  Arguably, the 
opportunities accompanying foreign investment are more vital to developing nations 
because of the potential economic benefits, including new avenues of employment, the 
exposure of domestic producers to new markets as well as an increase in liquid capital 
used to finance diverse development projects.  Firms are attracted to the developing 
world because of the ability to access abundant and inexpensive resources and factors of 
production, both of which can potentially lower the firm’s overall cost of production.  
However, there are two uncertainties that inhibit both parties from engaging in 
investment: the problem of ensuring commitments and guaranteeing the transfer of 
accurate and relevant information. 
This thesis serves the purpose to provide a better understanding of which states 
will receive foreign investment flows.  The impending research embodied throughout 
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this thesis will further dissect the informational uncertainty presented in the negotiation 
of investment by multinational firms and developing states by evaluating the concept of 
transparency and assessing its role in international investment flows to the developing 
world. 
This chapter will introduce the scope of my research through explaining how and 
why I chose to research the underlying problems of investment, the research design 
models and to convey a brief outline of the remaining chapters of this study. 
During my undergraduate studies, I was fortunate to spend a semester abroad in 
Europe.  Through my travels, I encountered various American brands and enterprises 
that were expanding their activities in Eastern and Western Europe.  American clothing 
companies such as Carhartt and Levi Strauss utilized their foreign presence to reinvent 
their brands in order to attract European youth consumers.  Fast food restaurants such 
as Kentucky Fried Chicken and Burger King followed a similar marketing strategy and 
successfully associated their products and services in Europe with a renowned sense of 
quality and prestige.  Even Anheuser-Busch rebranded their premium brew, Budweiser 
(known to Europeans simply as “Bud”) in order to adapt and appeal to the new 
consumer market as a premium import lager. 
With additional research, I found even more brands that modernized and 
implemented an alternative ego overseas.  After taking a class on the international 
political economy upon my return to the US, I became interested in the central 
motivations of firms to implement cross-border operations as a means to reinvent their 
products in new consumer markets.  The coursework identified the potential 
externalities that stem from foreign investment, especially in the developing world.  
After assessing the investment flows and its subsequent concentration in advanced 
	   	   J.	  Andrew	  Carter,	  Jr.	  
	   	   8	  
industrial economies, I was compelled to investigate why multinational firms do not 
concentrate their investment in the developing world. 
Research Design 
The research question guiding this thesis is, “What uncertainties inhibit firms 
from pursuing investment ventures in the developing world?” This is important to 
understand because investment can facilitate development and economic expansion in a 
particular developing economy.  The reduction of uncertainty and risk in investment 
negotiations results in increased investment opportunities. 
 This thesis relies on literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as the 
problems presented to investors and potential host nations throughout the duration of 
the negotiation process, such as a problem of ensuring commitments and appropriate 
information transfer.   These topics help distinguish the significance and vitality of 
investment in developing nations.  Analyzing existing literature on the problems of 
investment sheds light on the potential steps necessary to alleviate or reduce the 
uncertainty and risk of firms and states.  Scholarship on foreign investment by notable 
scholars such as Nathan Jensen (2003, 2006, 2008), suggest a positive relationship 
between democracy and investment.  While Jensen explains democracy to serve as a 
precursor to investment, why do autocratic regimes still receive investment flows?  
Other literature, such as the work of political scientist Daniel Kono (2006), supports the 
notion that the presence of democracy can actually decrease the probability of 
multinational investment due its protectionist legislation, strict corporate regulations, 
political accountability and term limits. 
If democracy cannot singlehandedly answer the problem of information transfer 
between negotiating parties, what other variables could serve as a prerequisite for 
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investment?  I attempt to answer this question by (1) studying the potential externalities 
of investment in the developing world, (2) examining the role of democracy in 
investment negotiation, and (3) offering a new prospective on how to counter the 
uncertainties of investment. 
By identifying what drives investment, it is easy to predict which states will 
receive increased investment flows.  Based on this method of analysis, I predict to find a 
robust positive correlation between the levels of investment among parties that employ 
various transparent vehicles, such as access-to-information legislation.  Transparency, 
therefore, can alleviate the problem of information in investment because of the implied 
availability of economic and political statistics among transparent states or firms. 
Data and Methods  
This thesis analyzes quantitative data on foreign direct investment to predict 
which states will receive increased investment flows.  In order to do so, this thesis 
examines the degree to which a state is democratic, the degree to which a state is 
transparent, total population, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, as well as the 
rate of GDP growth.   
Democracy can be empirically evaluated using the Polity IV dataset, which scores 
states based on the presence of democratic means of governance.  The degree to which a 
state is transparent can be empirically measured by constructing a ratio of the number 
of statistics reported by a particular state to international institutions, such as the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund.  Each year, the World Bank Indicators serve as 
the official statistics on the population, GDP per capita and rate of GDP growth of 
internationally recognized states. 
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Through OLS regression, I will test each variable in order to discover which 
variables are statistically significant in terms of increased FDI inflows.  I will also 
empirically evaluate the dependency of non-democratic regimes on transparency 
vehicles because of their inability to counter the commitment problem due to an 
absence of democracy.  The analysis will gage the importance of transparency in the 
allocation of FDI among various regime types throughout the developing world. 
Thesis Structure 
 Chapter one, Firms and Investment, provides necessary background information 
on the history and emergence of multinational firms, their role in the international 
economy, the current investment atmosphere, as well as the source and concentration of 
FDI flows. 
 Chapter two serves as a review of previous scholarship on FDI.  In this chapter, I 
will explore and analyze existing literature on the externalities of foreign investment, 
reservations presented in investment negotiations, and the insufficiencies of democracy 
to alleviate the problems faced by states and firms.  Although my assumptions presented 
in this thesis are primarily based on the economic aspects of FDI, I will also explore the 
literature on the political factors motivating FDI because it helps to better understand 
the broad impact of the presence of multinational firms in developing states. 
 Chapter three outlines my central theory about transparency serving as a possible 
prerequisite in investment negotiations.  In this chapter, I give the basis to my argument 
that transparency and democracy are not the same.  At the end of chapter three, I will 
present my hypotheses about transparency driving investment in the developing world 
and the increased dependence on transparency vehicles by autocratic regimes. 
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 In chapter four, I will present my empirical analysis and methodology.  I will 
statistically test both of my hypotheses outlined in the preceding central theory section 
and evaluate the levels of foreign investment flows and its dependency on the degree to 
which a state is transparent.  
 The concluding chapter of this thesis, chapter five, will provide a discussion and 
final assessment of my research.  I will formally present my conclusions and propose 
possible explanations for predicting which states will receive FDI.  Predicting FDI flows 
sheds insight on the development and consequent expansion of multinational firms in 
the developing world. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FIRMS AND INVESTMENT 
 
Enhanced by new means of communication, the exposure and subsequent 
integration of global markets have introduced the world’s biggest economic entities to 
economic opportunities in developing nations.  The term “developing” is misleading and 
not contingent on the development status and modernization of a specific country.  The 
World Bank categorizes member nations and other economies with more than 30,000 
people as “developing” if the gross national income (GNI) per capita is less than 
US$4,085 (World Bank 2014).  GNI per capita is the total output by citizens of a 
particular nation, consisting of gross domestic product (GDP) minus incomes of non-
citizens in that domestic economy (Todaro & Smith 2011: 44).  Because of the inability 
to finance costly economic development projects, lower income countries seek aid from 
developed nations, non-governmental organizations or more importantly, through 
avenues of investment by foreign firms in their domestic economy.  
Private firms with an international presence are the facilitators of foreign 
investment, which is the total net worth of a firm’s assets held abroad.  These firms, 
often referred to as multinational corporations, are proliferating throughout the global 
economy.  A multinational firm is a single corporate structure that controls and 
manages methods of production or financial assets in at least two different countries.  
Through foreign investment, firms extend managerial control across national borders 
and make decisions based on global market strategies to ensure corporate success and 
profitability.  The benefits of global expansion by firms include eased operations around 
the globe, reduced costs of production, tax incentives, market expansion, bypassing 
trade barriers and increased access to resources (Oatley 2012: 158-9). 
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Multinational firms emerged as a main component of the international economy 
during the late 19th centuries amid extensive colonialism.  Investment often mirrored 
colonial ties and helped increase the influence and dominance of global entities in their 
respective colonies by taking direct control over crucial sectors of their economy 
(Frieden 1994: 129).  This is best exemplified through the global trade and commerce 
generated by some of the earliest multinational firms, such as the British and Dutch 
East India Companies.   
Leading up to World War I, private firms from economic superpowers such as 
Great Britain and France invested in public utilities such as railroads, water and power 
plants and urban transportation throughout developing regions, such as in Latin 
America, East Asia and Africa (Frieden 1994: 127).  For example, in 1948 British 
architects designed, financed and constructed the first railway in South America in 
British-held Guyana as an effort to transport sugar from the Demerara Sugar Company 
over the Mahaica River, to the docks of Georgetown (Guyana 2014).  
The expansion of multinational activity throughout the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries was a result of the mounting foreign influence and consequent economic 
prosperity in current and former colonies.  The number of private firms without colonial 
ties increased their presence in the developing world because of the gradual integration 
of global markets and increased trade.  International trade aided the circulation of 
products and resources around the globe.  For example, by the 1970s, firms from the 
United States began competing with established firms headquartered in Great Britain 
for investment opportunities around the globe in chemical, pharmaceutical, electric, 
machinery, automobile, tire and processed food industries (Oatley 2012: 160). 
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The amount of firms internationalizing their activities in the global economy has 
increased dramatically in the past 30 years.  In 2008, the number of firms with overseas 
operations was eleven times more than the number of existing firms in the early 1980s.  
Today, over 80,000 firms own almost 700,000 affiliates in almost every country in the 
world (Jensen 2006: 24).  Multinational corporations account for over 30% of global 
exports and employ over 77 million people around the world (United Nations 2009: 
xxi). 
Figure 1.1: Number of Multinational Corporations  
 
  
 
(Source: Oatley 2012, 160; Gable & Bruner 2003, 3; UNCTAD 2009, Annex Table A. 1.8) 
 
Figure 1.1 emphasizes the expansion of the activities of private firm in the 
international economy by showing the steady growth of multinational firms since 1914.  
According to the graph, the number of firms with operations in multiple countries fell 
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just short of 5,000 in 1914 and increased to about 80,000 by 2007.  This increase over 
time indicates the integration of the international economy amid the expansion of 
multinational corporations. 
As more private entities increase their presence abroad, their significance in the 
global economy enhances.  To understand the impact multinational firms play the 
international economy, the methods in which firms internationalize their affairs must be 
understood.  There are two outlets of investment for firms: portfolio and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
Portfolio investment is the process by which firms purchase shares of a particular 
state’s stock market or by investing in government bonds, which is also known as 
sovereign lending.  Portfolio investments transfer capital from the firm to the host 
nation.  Foreign-held portfolio assets are more liquid and relatively mobile for foreign 
investors.  Under portfolio investment, investors are primarily concerned with the 
return rates, inducing a minimized, indirect control over the investment in the host 
economy. 
Foreign direct, or equity investment consists of purchasing or constructing 
physical property and equipment abroad. FDI is a product of a private firm’s strategic 
decision to internalize activities within a firm in ways that surpass political and national 
boundaries, in search for new methods of production and sources of profit.  Direct 
investment also includes profits of foreign affiliates that are reinvested rather than 
repatriated to parent firms and enterprises.  The overall value of FDI is measured at the 
historical cost of the asset, which indicates its initial value.  Figures on FDI can be 
deceptive because they do not fully represent the current market value, which can 
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fluctuate due to external factors such as changing exchange rates, inflation or 
depreciation (Walter & Sen 2009: 173-4). 
Unlike portfolio investment, FDI is active and highly immobile, requiring a long-
term fixed investment that is not easily liquidated.  Direct investment is when a parent 
firm owns at least 10% equity in the foreign affiliate (Walter & Sen 2009: 173).  This type 
of investment enables multinational firms to control portions of their assets, rendering 
FDI as a source of authority within a foreign economy.  The remainder of this study will 
focus solely on investment classified as foreign direct not only because of its immobile 
status and implied multinational control, but also because of the potentially greater 
influence and applicability of transparency presented in FDI (formally presented and 
hypothesized at the end of chapter 3 and empirically tested in chapter 4).   
Foreign direct investment has become increasingly popular over time.  FDI, 
unlike loan packages or governmental aid, is multi-faceted in the sense that the 
investment is sustainable and has the potential to mutually benefit both the state and 
the multinational corporation (Drabek & Payne 2001: 5).  Because of the mutual 
benefits, investment outflows have been on the steady rise.  In 2008, FDI amassed to 
US$16.2 trillion, an increase of 2,300% since 1980 (United Nations 2009).  The increase 
of FDI produced higher growth rates than the global GDP from 1986 through 1989 and 
again in 1995 (Drabek & Payne 2001: 5). 
It is important to know the source of FDI in order to examine its effects 
throughout the global economy.  The bulk of FDI is supplied by advanced industrial 
economies. Over 90 of the 100 largest multinational firms are headquartered in the 
United States, Western Europe or Japan (Oatley 2012: 162). In 2008, advanced 
industrial economies were responsible for over 81% of the US$16.2 trillion world foreign 
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direct outflows (United Nations 2009).  Since 1999, the United States, Luxembourg, 
United Kingdom, France and Germany have dominated FDI outflows (Walter & Sen 
2009: 177).  
Figure 1.2: FDI Outflows 
 
 
 
(Source: United Nations 2009) 
  
Identifying investment outflows by region indicates the proportion of assets in 
the international economy owned by firms headquartered in a particular region.  
Figure 1.2 identifies the nominal FDI outflows from various regions of the world since 
1986.  According to the graph, the majority of outflows come from the European Union 
and North America.  Combined, both regions supplied over 70% of FDI in 2007 and 
2008.  Latin America and Africa did not supply FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
but have since shown a steady increase in FDI outflows.   
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Even though advanced industrial economies supply the bulk of foreign 
investment, the majority of investment flows are not concentrated in the developing 
world. Despite the fact that multinational firms facilitate global operations, the majority 
of their activities are centralized in other high-income, developed nations.  This is 
surprising because the largest recipients of FDI are other advanced industrial 
economies, such as the United States and various nations in the European Union.  
Combined, the United States and European Union received more than 75% of the 
world’s FDI throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Oatley 2012: 162-3).  Both entities remain 
the dominant recipients of FDI, claiming 57% of foreign investment in 2008 (United 
Nations 2009).  Increased competition for foreign investment in less developed 
countries can explain the slight decrease in their combined investment inflows since the 
late 1990s. 
Multinational firms are becoming increasingly attracted to the developing world.  
The presence of multinational corporations in the developing world is the response to 
their imperfect domestic product and factor markets, such as insufficient supplies of 
land, labor or capital.  The process of firms internationalizing their activities is also a 
direct response to governmental intervention and regulation in business proceedings 
such as taxation and the establishment of trade barriers (Walter & Sen 2009: 179).   
Inflows to the developing world doubled from 1980 to 1997 to US$190 billion, 
accounting for just under half of total foreign investment (Oatley 2012: 163).  FDI in the 
developing world continues to increase, such as in 2008 when FDI inflows amassed to 
an astonishing US$620 billion (United Nations 2009).  However, FDI is not distributed 
equally throughout the developing world.  The majority of investment is concentrated in 
a small number of developing nations, such as China, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for 
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various economic, geographic and political reasons (Oatley 2012: 164).  This serves as a 
prime example of the inadequate distribution of FDI and highlights the potential pitfalls 
or misunderstandings that can occur between investors and host governments in the 
establishment of investment. 
Figure 1.3: FDI Inflows 
 
 
 
(Source: United Nations 2009)1 
  
Figure 1.3 reveals the concentration of nominal FDI inflows broken down by 
various regions since 1986.  Not only are the inflow statistics important in determining 
which states receive FDI, it is also important because it can help distinguish trends in 
certain regions regarding the allocation of FDI.  Multinational firms can explore new 
economic opportunities in regions where multinational investment is on the rise.  For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  dissimilar	  2007-­‐2008	  world	  value	  of	  FDI	  inflow,	  as	  compared	  to	  previous	  world	  output	  values,	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  economic	  recession	  and	  the	  scarcity	  of	  credit	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  systems.	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example, Figure 1.3 indicates an overall increase of FDI inflows in Africa, Latin 
America and North America since 1986, which could result in increased investment 
because of the presence of other multinational firms.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
In order to understand the framework of my central research question about the 
uncertainties inhibiting investment in the developing world, I am most concerned with 
current literature on foreign direct investment; the problem of commitment and 
information in negotiation; as well as the applicability of transparency as an instrument 
in investment ventures.  This chapter will explore and analyze the research and 
conclusions of previous scholars as a means to distinguish my hypothesis from existing 
published material.   
The expansive presence of multinational firms in the developing world has a 
substantial impact on the domestic economies of host nations.  Through the 
internationalization of their corporate activities, firms have the indirect ability to 
transform and improve existing financial systems of host nations, which has the 
potential to result in more complete, stable and better-regulated markets on a 
macroeconomic scale.  The existence of sound financial systems fosters economic 
growth for developing nations because of its ability to monitor credit and play a role in 
the allocation of resources.  The resulting byproduct of multinational investment is 
economic growth and stability and well-rounded financial market infrastructure, which 
enables borrowers and lenders to operate in a more competitive, efficient environment 
with minimal risk and maximum credit (Schmukler 2004: 316). 
In order to initiate the development of sound financial systems, firms must first 
provide host nations with access to scarce factors of production: capital, technology, and 
managerial expertise.  The positive externalities that stem from increased economic 
opportunities are particularly attractive to the developing world because they enable 
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firms to address each economic limitation through the creation of jobs and consumer 
bases, the accumulation of capital from a transfer in savings between countries, 
technological modernization, importation of industrial and managerial expertise, as well 
as the introduction of domestic producers to the multinational firm’s global consumer 
network (Oatley 2012: 173). 
The promise of capital, technological modernization, managerial expertise and 
global marketing networks comes at a price to developing nations.  There is a growing 
consensus that implies that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has a positive effect on 
domestic, national economies.  However, multinational entities suffer negative 
portrayals among citizens and government officials in developing states regarding their 
role in the broader, international economy.  Firms can pose as a direct threat to 
economic prosperity due to their ability to exploit dominant facets of the host nation’s 
economy and thwart competition (Jensen 2006: 33).  
Economic Opportunities 
The presence of multinational firms in a developing nation produces economic 
opportunities to the host nation by employing its local citizenry and producers.  The 
creation of jobs for the local citizenry aids in maintaining and improving the standard of 
living of the host nation.  Multinational firms also employ domestic producers by 
consuming domestically produced goods and resources.  By providing jobs and utilizing 
domestic products, multinational firms can directly stimulate the host nation’s economy 
(Jensen 2006: 31).  
Because multinational firms operate within a widespread global marketing 
network, new economic opportunities are presented to other producers and affiliates in 
host nations.  The global production strategies of the majority of multinational firms 
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incorporate local producers and suppliers; therefore exposing their products and 
resources to new consumer markets.  This exposure allows domestic firms and 
industries to potentially profit from their increased presence in the international 
economy (Oatley 2012: 174).  
However, this is not always the case.  Multinational corporations have the 
potential to negatively impact the domestic economy by overpowering locally dominated 
markets and pushing indigenous competing firms out of business.  These potential 
negative externalities produce increased levels of risk among potential host nations.  
Because of the funding necessary to implement global operations, multinational firms 
can use their implied wealth to purchase domestic firms in order to eliminate 
competition (Frieden et al. 2010: 154).  If not, multinational firms still remain 
advantageous over competition.  Often times, multinational firms have the technological 
resources necessary to facilitate lower costs of production, giving them an advantage 
over domestic competition.  As multinational firms expand their production capacity, 
established local firms will began to lose sales to their low-cost, multinational 
competitor.  In effect, the demand for locally produced inputs and resources will fall, 
driving indigenous suppliers out of business, resulting in a treacherous cycle of domestic 
firms being replaced by dominant foreign firms (Oatley 2012: 175). 
Due to the absence of domestic savings and sovereign capital accounts, 
developing states are unable to finance governmental day-to-day services, public goods, 
and external indebtedness. FDI permits the transfer of savings of a firm to a host 
country, which provides developing nations with more capital to allocate to existing 
expenditures while also enabling nations to finance new development projects that 
result in economic expansion.  The increase in available capital can also aid in the 
	   	   J.	  Andrew	  Carter,	  Jr.	  
	   	   24	  
stabilization of the host country’s external indebtedness, which hinders the rate of 
economic growth and development (Drabek & Payne 2001: 5). 
Once capital is transferred from a firm to a state after an investment venture, 
developing states could impose tight controls on capital due to the limited volume of 
their capital accounts.  Capital controls are the measures taken by a state to limit the 
flow of foreign capital in or out of the domestic economy through volume restrictions, 
tariffs, and taxes.  For example, firms may have difficulty finalizing investments or have 
their assets legally trapped inside the country by legislation or political red tape.  Having 
said, capital controls of developing states are also prone to volatility and increase 
investor risk (Li & Resnick 2003: 193, 198). 
The increase in capital can enable sufficient investments in new technology.  
Technological modernization benefits both the firm and the host nation.  Advanced 
industrial economies have more innovative technologies that decrease the cost of 
production while simultaneously increasing production efficiency.  The transfers and 
implementation of technology into the current production methods of overseas facilities 
decreases the overall cost to produce inputs for the multinational firm.  The new 
technology has the potential to be transferred to the host nation’s domestic producers, 
decreasing the cost of production and increasing manufacturing and sales (Oatley 2012: 
174).   
The transfer of technology is most commonly associated to investments involving 
the extraction of natural resources, such as in oil refinery or copper mining. The earliest 
multinational firms were motivated by potential profits from the extraction of large 
deposits of natural resources in developing countries.  Multinational corporations often 
control substantial portions of natural resources in developing nations, especially in 
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host nations with extensive reserves of oil and copper.  The presence of multinational 
firms increases the probability that they will have a significant role in influencing the 
allocation of the state’s natural resources.  This results in a shift of control in crucial 
sectors of the host nation’s economy away from the government and toward 
multinational firms (Oatley 2012: 166).   
Like technology, managerial expertise has the potential to be transferred to 
domestic firms and host country affiliates.  The importation of managerial expertise 
plays a substantial role in a state’s development.  Operations in multiple countries 
distinguish multinational firms as better skilled in coordinating and organizing 
production and boosting efficiency. The labor force of the host nation can learn the 
management practices and apply them to other indigenous firms (Oatley 2012: 174). 
The Uncertainties of Investment 
The initial terms of the investment negotiation are crucial in order to ensure the 
positive externalities and ward off the negative effects of FDI.  When two or more 
entities engage in negotiation, each participant has the explicit incentive to safeguard 
their personal interests.  Investigating the protective measures of states and 
multinational corporations highlights the uncertainties of both parties in investment 
opportunities. 
The widespread influence of multinational firms in the global economy can 
decrease the role of the host nation in economic activities.  Multinational executives are 
more experienced in conducting negotiations due to their presence in the international 
economy.  This grants them the ability to greater influence terms of investment with the 
less-developed regulatory bureaucracies of host nations.  In effect, host nations have the 
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responsibility of protecting the crucial sectors of their domestic economy when initiating 
investment with multinational firms (Frieden et al. 2010: 156). 
As previously discussed, multinational corporations propose investment 
opportunities to potential host nations.  Firms want to decrease the role the host 
government plays in their business affairs so that they can operate self-sufficiently in the 
international economy.  In order to do so, the state can tailor investment proposals to 
safeguard their interests.  The firms outline stipulations of the investment that offer 
benefits to the firm such as discounted resources, tax breaks, and minimized regulation 
of business proceedings in exchange for long-term development projects, loans and 
other economic opportunities.  Through decreasing the role of the state in the 
investment, firms can properly protect their assets, decreasing the probability that a 
host country will take its asset under direct control, also known as expropriation (Oatley 
2012: 175).   
 Expropriation is the illicit seizure of a firm’s assets by a governmental entity.  In 
the event of an expropriation, the ownership and output of the asset is nationalized by 
the host government and brought under the direct control of the state.  Assets with long-
term value are more prone to expropriation because of its profitability to host 
governments.  Besides economic gain, there are also political benefits to expropriating 
assets.  Expropriating foreign direct assets gratifies the demand for social change and 
nationalism because it implies more control over firms operating within the domestic 
economy (Li 2005: 8).  This is best exemplified by the nationalizations of authoritarian 
regimes in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s.  The political elites of these 
regimes rose to power on populist platforms that called for the redistribution of foreign 
held assets in the domestic economy (Tarzi 1991: 175). 
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Expropriating assets does not always guarantee political or economic prosperity.  
Foreign held assets can lose value amid expropriation if the multinational corporation 
imported managerial or technological expertise.  The more integrated the asset into a 
particular corporate network, the less threat of host government takeover (Li 2009: 
1106-7). 
 The deadlock between states and multinational corporations in negotiation 
emphasizes the importance of each party protecting their private agenda.  In effect, this 
questions the motives and reservations of each party to pursue investment 
opportunities.  Political scientist Nathan Jensen and other scholars have investigated 
the motivations for firms to proceed to invest in the developing world as well as 
identified and thoroughly dissected the uncertainties presented by both parties. 
Jensen’s research attempts to explain what actions governments and host nations 
can take to alleviate perceived investor risk.  The bulk of Jensen’s argument revolves 
around his idea that the biggest problem facing states and firms is the inability to ensure 
commitments and to guarantee the accurate transfer of information between negotiating 
parties.  According to Jensen, it is necessary to understand the implications of the 
problems of commitment and information before developing a proper understanding of 
the allocation of foreign investment flows around the world (Jensen 2006: 3). 
Commitment Problem 
In the decision to expand a multinational corporation’s affairs overseas, investors 
encounter certain obstacles when dealing with host nations in the developing world.  
One of the most prevalent obstructions is the anarchic state of the global economy. 
International law that could be used to uphold agreements between the private sector 
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and a host nation is non-applicable.  States and firms that break contractual agreements 
are not held accountable by any international standard (Frieden 1994: 122).   
Even though states want to receive FDI, multinational firms initiate investment 
opportunities by proposing the investment terms to a potential host nation.  After 
agreeing to the terms, the majority of the bargaining power is transferred from the firm 
to the state because of their shifting preference to obtain greater shares of the 
investment, prompting a time consistency problem.  For example, if a host nation is 
motivated to initiate investment because of its depleted capital accounts, their 
preferences are more likely to shift after capital has been successfully transferred from 
the firm to the state in order to finance the specified investment.  The changing 
preferences of the state can also be attributed to the attraction to possible short-run 
benefits of the investment, which could potentially be more lucrative to government 
regimes in developing states.  After achieving short-run benefits such as the immediate 
availability of capital, the host nation is incentivized to alter the long-run conditions of 
the investment with the firm (Tomz, 1997: 5). 
Finding a way to arbitrate commitments is crucial in enforcing the stipulated 
terms of investment between multinationals and host governments.  Because of the 
shifting preferences of the state after an investment has been initiated, investors face the 
inevitable problem of how to ensure that commitments will be upheld in the short and 
long run. In order to decrease the likelihood that states will alter the terms of 
agreements with multinational firms, a method of arbitration is necessary.  Through 
commitment devices such as agreements via international institutions, states are able to 
increase credibility through the restriction of policy reversal by elevating the cost of 
going back on agreements (Tomz, 1997: 5).  Firms and states can utilize the services of 
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international institutions to mediate agreements.  Prominent international institutions, 
such as the World Bank and International Monetary fund are used as mediators can 
relieve investor risk.  This promotes the legitimacy of the agreement between the firm 
and the multinational corporation in cross-border investment.  Developing states that 
can showcase their ability to uphold commitments via international institutions have 
the opportunity to yield increased investment inflows (Buthe & Milner 2008: 758). 
Committing to agreements with multinational firms has a direct reputational 
value for developing nations.  Nations that decide to expropriate private assets suffer an 
undeniable setback to their international reputation.  In the pursuit of attracting foreign 
investment, it serves detrimental for a nation to have an unstable history of 
expropriations of foreign-held assets.  Nationalization directly increases the level of 
perceived risk and discourages investment because of its obvious unfavorable and 
adverse affects on multinational corporations (Jensen et al 2012: 4).   
There are many examples of nationalizations and its negative reputational 
outcomes.  A noteworthy and infamous example occurred in the early 1950s after 
Mohammed Mossadegh became the prime minister of the new democracy in Iran.  
Mossadegh’s regime attempted to expropriate the refineries British-owned Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (now known as British Petroleum).  This action led to a boycott of 
Iranian oil by the United Kingdom and its allies, which resulted in financial hardship for 
the Iranian government and citizenry (Tarzi 1991: 175). 
Another incentive for states to uphold commitments with multinational firms is 
the attractive economic opportunities that spill over to other sectors of the state’s 
economy.  For example, FDI is complementary to trade agreements for developing 
states.  Firms are able to incorporate their established trading networks into the host 
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nation’s trade spheres.  Through this process, Developing states are able to establish a 
broader sphere of trade with the presence of multinational corporations within their 
borders, directly increasing the state’s economic potential (Buthe & Milner 2008: 758).   
Information Problem 
Another constraint to the initiation of foreign investment in international 
agreements is a mode by which information is released, relayed and processed between 
multinational corporations and their host nations.  As Jensen’s second problem with 
FDI, the information problem regards risk analysis and the availability of fiscal data as 
well as the state’s political and economic policies to foreign investors.  Compared to the 
commitment problem in investment, the information problem has received far less 
attention by Jensen and other scholars. 
Information is crucial to foreign investors because it helps identify and 
potentially explain market and governmental peculiarities.  Multinational firms 
headquartered in developed nations need to be cognizant of the implications of which 
their assets will be subjected.  From market conditions to regional business cycles, 
investors value information pertaining to holding an asset in a foreign economy.   
Proper assessments through risk analysis reports play a key role in a firm 
deciding to pursue investment opportunities.  Risk analysis reports outline perceived 
investor risk by highlighting implications of a particular economy, sector or regime. 
Multinational firms investing in developing states are forced to supplement any 
information not provided by the government at their own expense, rendering 
transparent economic data to be cost-effective to investors. (Hollyer et al. 2011: 1202).   
The absence of information about certain economies or markets insinuates 
increased corruption, or dishonest behavior of leaders or government officials.  Actions 
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such as double-dealing, initiating closed-door transactions, diverting funds, taking 
bribes, and defrauding investors are considered corrupt practices, which could 
potentially be risky and costly to firms.  By providing information to investors, states 
can properly introduce multinational firms to the methods and protocols in which the 
potential host nation conducts investment negotiations (Drabek & Payne 2001: 6). 
Jensen’s Assessment of Democracy 
Jensen’s published literature proposes that democracy is the necessary factor that 
remedies the inability of each party to uphold commitments and ensure the transfer of 
information pertaining to investment (2008).  Democratic political institutions can 
provide market-friendly policies that showcase higher levels of credibility to investors.  
The democratic system of checks and balances as well as popular elections point reduce 
the probability of policy reversal and provides multinational corporations with a de facto 
commitment to policy stability.  Jensen argues that the accountability of democratically 
elected officials results in reliable source of information about the domestic economy to 
investors (Jensen 2006: 1-3). 
Published literature by Jensen (2003, 2008) proposes that democracy solves the 
problem of commitment between firms and states in FDI.  According to Jensen, 
democratic governments decrease the political risks in investment through credibility 
and stability in the international political economy.  Because of the accountability 
achieved through democracy, common policies such as institutional checks and 
balances, popular elections and the presence of veto players (a chamber of legislature, 
supreme court, and the separation of the executive and legislative branches of 
government) render democracies more liable to maintain commitments with investors 
in foreign investment agreements (Jensen 2003: 592-3).   
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Jensen explains that democracies foster a hospitable political climate for 
investors because of the eased ability to influence policy decision-making.  Democracies 
allow for multinational investors to influence policy outcomes through lobbying or 
campaign contributions to politicians (Jensen 2008: 1050).  Constituents have the 
opportunity to hold individual leaders politically responsible for policy changes in a 
democratic government.  The economic benefits that accompany multinational 
investment incentivize democratically elected leaders to uphold contractual agreements 
with international firms.  Through the means of accountability, the reputational costs of 
expropriation of multinational assets or breaking conditions of negotiations with firms 
is increased among constituents and can result in a politician losing his/her office 
(Jensen 2008: 1041). 
Alongside the accountability and ability influence governmental policy, Jensen 
explains that investors are also comforted by various protectionist measures, unique to 
democratic regimes.  Often times, democratic governments provide strong systems of 
protection, in areas such as property rights for multinational firms through different 
legislation or policy.  Independent judiciaries and electoral challenges help to guarantee 
property rights protection legislation to secure assets in the long run, accumulating 
more attraction to invest (Li & Resnick 2003: 176, 203). 
With proper protection and policies to ensure asset security, therefore, 
democratic regimes lower the levels of investor risk and create an increased sense of 
political and economic stability to investment firms.  The lowered investor risk through 
democracy can be empirically tested, emphasized in Jensen’s 2008 study that resulted 
in higher levels of investor confidence, which facilitated an increased inflow of foreign 
investment.  According to Jensen, states with higher levels of democracy receive 
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increased amounts of FDI (Jensen 2008: 1050).  Jensen supports his hypothesis by 
citing data on FDI in advanced industrial economies such as the United States. 
Because of the representational responsibilities of democratic politicians, 
democratic regimes produce an overwhelming sense of political and economic openness.  
Jensen suggests that democratic regimes have an increased likelihood to release policy-
relevant data at a higher rate than most autocracies because of the accountability factor.  
According to Jensen, democracy yields transparent economic policy because it is an 
outlet for constituents to hold elected executive and legislative officials accountable for 
their proposed policies and economic agendas.  Democratic politicians are therefore 
incentivized to be transparent and use transparency as a tool for re-election by 
highlighting their accomplishments in office.  The observation of increased levels of 
transparency in democratic regimes insinuates that transparency is a common 
byproduct of democracy (Jensen 2008: 1040-2). 
Other studies, such as that of James Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff and James 
Raymond Vreeland (2011), have proven that democracies yield higher levels of 
transparency than nondemocratic regimes.  In democratic regimes, the electorate values 
copious amounts of information.  Because of the demand for increased information, 
democratic leaders are motivated to be open about economic policy and different facets 
of the economy in order to obtain votes to keep him/her in office.  The availability, 
accuracy, and quality of economic data is driven by democratic political institutions that 
serve as a resource tool for citizens and domestic firms to gage market performance and 
domestic economic activities (Hollyer et al. 2011: 1202). 
Limitations of Democracy 
Contradicting Jensen’s proposal that the presence of democracy can counter the 
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problems of investment, other scholars such as Quan Li and Adam Resnick (2003: 198) 
suggest that investors are actually comforted by the absence of democracy, speculating 
that states with recent transitions to democracy and states with higher levels of 
democracy have a negative impact on foreign investment inflows due to strict industrial 
regulation and voter-accountability of politicians.   
Democratic states limit the oligopolistic and monopolistic behaviors of 
multinational firms through market regulation and the protection of domestic producers 
(Jensen 2003: 593).  Protection of crucial sectors of the economy directly increases 
competition between multinational firms and domestic producers.  The increased levels 
of democracy, therefore, could turn investors away from investing in democratic 
regimes due to the imposing constraints on the economy through regulatory measures 
and policies that favor domestic industrial protection (Li & Resnick 2003: 194-8).  
The presence of democracy can potentially increase investor risk due to the 
ability of competing interest groups to influence government policy.  Local firms 
represented by lobbying groups can influence politicians in a democracy because of their 
deep knowledge of local markets and other domestic producers.  Because politicians 
want to appease their constituents, the knowledge of the domestic economy can be of 
high value to democratic politicians when drafting and ratifying economic policy.  The 
democratic accountability of democratic regimes can limit the profitability and scope of 
multinational firms in the host economy (Jensen 2008: 1052).   
Politicians can only be accountable to constituents while they hold public office.  
Term limits prevalent in democratic regimes can carry serious implications to 
multinational firms.  In the democratic system, policy preferences required for electoral 
survival by individual politicians is volatile.  The changing preferences of politicians 
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across different administrations can result in the altering or changing established 
economic policy by newly elected politicians, resulting in economic instability.  Policy 
reversal in democratic regimes could be very harmful to the initial terms of investment 
outlined by multinational firms (Jensen 2008; 1042). 
Multinational firms can be attracted to nondemocratic regimes because of the 
absence of term limits of elites, the lack of popular pressure from constituents as well as 
the ability to offer bribes and financial incentives to elites in exchange for cooperation or 
protection.  Autocratic regimes can also entice investors with alternative benefits such as 
the repression of labor unions in an effort to lower wages and minimize labor standards.  
Lower wages and the absence of strict labor laws help reduce the cost of production for 
multinational corporations, increasing the attraction of multinational firms to autocratic 
regimes (Jensen 2006: 7). 
Regardless of regime type, Jensen’s problems of commitment and information in 
investment are still pertinent.  Jensen’s analysis of the problems accompanying 
investment, the high volume of information produced by democracy directly addresses 
the informational problem with investment.  However, democracy as the answer to the 
information problem is not entirely accurate.   
Critics of Jensen’s claim that democracy solves the information problem, such as 
Daniel Kono (2006: 381-2) find that democracy produces complexity rather than 
transparency.  Because consumers prefer liberal trade policies that lower prices and 
raise real income, democratically elected leaders should support liberal economic policy 
positions.  However, democratic governments benefit financially from tariffs and trade 
barriers, funding government programs as well as politicians’ salaries.  Democratic 
politicians, therefore, are more inclined to utilize non-tariff barriers (NTB) because of 
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their lucrative value and ability to be opaque to the general public.  “Core” non-tariff 
barriers encompass both price and quantity control measures, such as price caps, import 
licenses and quotas.  “Quality” non-tariff barriers enforce product standards through 
labeling requirements, packaging standards, inspection, testing and certification.  The 
majority of core and almost all quality NTBs are virtually overlooked by constituents 
because to the serious complexity of its terms.  This tactic used by politicians is 
applicable to trade but it also speaks to the information problems in foreign investment 
(Kono 2006: 370-2). 
Democratic politicians have the power to misuse transparency to distract their 
constituents.  Providing too much information through transparent measures allows 
politicians to maintain a positive reputation among voters.  By releasing extraneous 
information, politicians can cover up adverse economic policies.  In order to overshadow 
negative outcomes of economic policies, politicians can overuse the level of transparency 
as a byproduct of democracy (Finel & Lord 1999: 320). 
Due to the conflicting evidence against the notion that democracy provides 
investors with sufficient amounts of economic information, there are serious limitations 
when explaining democracy as the sole alleviator of the information problem. 
Alternative Proposal: Transparency 
The potential for increased economic activity that accompanies foreign 
investment has incentivized some developing states to remodel certain economic 
policies to increase foreign investment inflows.  One of the mechanisms in which states 
increase investment is through the adoption of transparent economic and political 
policies.  Developing states are subjected to an influx of external pressures from an 
overwhelming number of governments, multinational firms and international 
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institutions around the globe to adopt transparent political and economic policies to 
ensure the transfer of information.  This trend among states, firms and institutions 
insinuates that the role of transparency is increasing in the decision-making process 
presented in investment ventures (Oatley 2012: 194, 200). 
Because of the implicit economic and reputational benefits of investment, states 
are motivated to adopt transparent policies to address investor risk and ensure the 
availability of political and economic information.  For example, access-to-information 
legislation attempts to address transparency by requiring industries, corporations and 
governments to publish vital economic statements and applicable legislation regarding 
their domestic economy (Hollyer et al. 2011: 1194).  The presence of transparent policies 
provides clear reputational benefits that directly acknowledge investor risk by increasing 
the perception of a state’s institutional quality.  As a result of the reputational benefits, 
there is a growing and undeniable shift in investor preference toward fiscal transparency 
and openness when considering negotiating investment opportunities (Relly & 
Sabharwal 2009: 149). 
Whether or not democratic or autocratic states adopt transparent policies, there 
is no international law that enforces access-to-information legislation.  For example, a 
survey issued by the Bulgarian Access to Information Program Foundation in 2000 
indicated that only 42% of Bulgarian administrators had effectively implemented 
Bulgaria’s freedom of information legislation after its inception (Islam 2003: 13). 
Instead, states are not required to disclose complete and accurate information 
regarding their economies.  Because the desire for investment inflow in the developing 
world is relatively higher than in developed nations, developing states even have 
incentives to omit or fabricate economic data that is not conducive in attracting 
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investment.  The process of excluding unfavorable economic data in various sectors is 
presented as a better substitute than altering data or disclosing accurate information to 
potential investors.  Both the exclusion and the fabrication of economic data indicate the 
limitations presented with transparency (Hollyer et al. 2011: 1193).  For example, in the 
mid 2000s, Greece “cooked the books,” or fabricated financial data by reporting 
overstated revenues amid their introduction into the Euro Zone, which resulted in a 
widespread financial crisis within the European Union (Spathis 2002: 179). 
Transparency is understood to be an indicator of the overall capacity of a state to 
effectively govern its constituents.  High levels of transparency produce positive 
perceptions of governance, stability and trust in a regime.  Better governance is 
empirically linked with higher economic growth because of the ability of leaders to make 
better economic and political decisions.  Evident transparency insinuates increased 
levels of trust and security among foreign investors, reducing risk and potentially 
increasing the likelihood of investment in that particular state (Islam 2003: 35-6).  
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CHAPTER 3 
CENTRAL THEORY 
 
The published literature on foreign investment has overlooked the importance 
and necessity of the transfer of information in investment.  Previous scholars, as earlier 
mentioned, focus their research on presenting the steps to alleviate the uncertainties of 
commitment between participating entities in investment negotiations.  After 
highlighting the oversights in the research of previous scholars on foreign investment 
and the negotiation process between states and multinational firms, my theory emerges.  
My theory represents an alternative, yet equally compelling, angle on alleviating the 
informational uncertainty presented through FDI. 
Jensen’s Problems of Investment 
Jensen’s proposed commitment and information problems in investment are 
pertinent to my central theory.  However, Jensen’s argument does not fully dissect his 
second problem of information in investment.  His proposed solution of democracy to 
counter the commitment problem is acceptable but is inadequate and insufficient in 
terms of the overall ability to alleviate the full scope of the problem of asymmetric 
information.  Autocratic regimes still receive investment inflows despite their inability 
to counter the commitment problem. 
The information problem produces uncertainties about the trade-off distribution 
that benefits both entities.  Democracy’s inability to singlehandedly resolve the 
information problem is highlighted when examining the bargaining power.  The 
bargaining power fluctuates due to the various incentives of both parties to work 
together in the initiation of investment.  
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Developing nations appear to have the critical advantage in the negotiations of 
FDI.  The advantage takes the form of the state’s ability to open its borders to firms and 
grant access to its domestic markets, labor pools and natural resources.  At the same 
time, multinational firms also have a bargaining advantage because they possess the 
required capital, technology, managerial expertise and access to world markets that aid 
in the economic development of emerging nations.  Thus producing a competition 
between firms and states for an upper hand in the bargaining process (Tarzi 1991: 169).   
Evaluating the incentives of firms to invest in developing nations highlights the 
importance of the flow and availability of relevant and accurate information between 
multinationals and states. 
Incentives to Engage in Investment Ventures 
 A firm’s decision to invest abroad revolves around specific characteristics of the 
economic atmosphere surrounding the potential investment.  Firms are more likely to 
invest where necessary resources and factors of production are abundant and 
inexpensive.  Economists explain this phenomenon by using locational advantages as 
well as market particularities to explain why a multinational firm would decide to 
internationalize its operations and invest overseas (Oatley 2012: 165). 
Locational advantages are derived from specific country characteristics that 
provide unique economic opportunities to firms, which are unavailable in their current 
operating facilities.  Types of locational advantages include large quantities of natural 
resources, exposure to dynamic and growing local markets, and opportunities to 
enhance the efficiency of operations (Oatley 2012: 165). 
The presence of large deposits of raw materials in a developing nation can be 
lucrative to multinational firms.  It is through natural-resource investment that the 
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technological and managerial expertise of multinational is most valuable to developing 
nations.  Often times, developing nations do not possess the technological or managerial 
expertise to properly or efficiently extract valuable resources such as petroleum, copper 
and aluminum.  Multinationals can generate profit by providing states with efficient 
strategies and equipment to extract and allocate domestic resources throughout the 
world market (Tarzi 1991: 171). 
Large and growing markets in developing countries provide multinationals with 
new avenues of business and broader consumer bases.  Multinational firms initiate 
market-oriented investment strategies in an effort to capitalize on the new consumer 
bases of potential host nations.  Multinational firms are more profitable without 
competition in consumer markets and the absence of competition serves as a critical 
factor of market-oriented investment.  Firms can gain oligopolistic power through 
investment opportunities that enable them to monopolize their operations and have 
more supply and price control (Tarzi 1991: 170). 
Tariff and nontariff barriers also motivate multinational firms to invest in 
developing states in an effort to avoid excessive expenditures in the international 
economy.  By engaging in foreign investment, firms can dodge various import taxes to 
remain a major player in that particular economy.  Circumventing these tariffs has the 
opportunity to further increase the scope of the multinational firm by utilizing trade 
agreements and treaties of the host nation.  For example, throughout the 1990s, 
multinational firms in the automotive industry such as BMW, Honda, Nissan and 
Toyota, made direct investments in the United States in order to bypass export 
restraints that limited the number of automobiles imported into the United States 
(Oatley 2010: 167). 
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Firms are also motivated to expand their production overseas through efficiency-
motivated foreign investment.  This type of investment has the potential to decrease the 
overall cost of production by redistributing different stages of the production process to 
accentuate the factor abundance of particular countries.  For example, multinational 
firms in sectors such as electronics demand low-skilled, labor-intensive production.  To 
these firms, countries with abundant labor pools will have a competitive advantage over 
labor-scarce countries when considering where to invest (Oatley 2010: 167). 
Like locational advantages, minimized market imperfections serve as a central 
motivation for firms to invest in developing countries.  Market imperfections prevent 
firms from capitalizing and profiting on the locational advantages of an investment.  For 
example, a firm reluctant to disclose patented production recipes or “know-how” 
information (both of which serve as ‘intangible assets’) has the incentive to internalize 
its affairs under a single corporate structure.  Under a unified structure, firms can 
ensure that each production facility utilizes the intangible asset to its fullest ability while 
also benefitting from the locational advantages (Oatley 2010: 169). 
Together, locational advantages and market imperfections, absent of political 
variables, are fundamental in the decision of firms to engage in foreign investment.  
Minimized market imperfections enable the firm to fully capitalize on the locational 
advantages in the potential investment by internalizing their activities under a united 
corporate structure.  Through the process of negotiating investment, firms are required 
respond to the unique facets of the host nation’s economy and implement strategies that 
properly acclimate their presence in the new economy in which they will operate.  As 
long as firms are able to produce a full evaluation and assessment of a potential host 
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economy, firms will embark on investment opportunities where market imperfections 
maximize locational advantages. 
 On the opposite side of investment negotiations, states have the incentive to 
initiate investment because of the positive externalities that stem from the presence of 
multinational corporations in their domestic economies.  Like previously mentioned, 
states benefit from foreign investment because of the ability of firms to provide host 
nations with scarce factors of production through the transfer capital, technology and 
managerial expertise as well as access to new opportunities to domestic producers 
through the introduction to new global consumer bases (Oatley 2012: 158).  These 
transfers of technology, managerial skills, capital and the exposure to markets through 
FDI significantly increase the bargaining power and economic potential of host nations. 
Acquiescing control of various facets of their domestic economy can accelerate 
the progression of economic development in host nations.  States can utilize the 
experience, technology and managerial expertise of multinational firms to potentially 
maximize economic potential and further develop dominant sectors of their economy.  
The desire for development incentivizes host nations to improve their administrative 
proficiency in areas such as international import and export compliance, taxation law, 
financial and industrial analysis as well as corporate accounting.  By improving the 
expertise in these sectors, host nations can increase their surveillance of multinational 
firms operating within their borders.  This improvement in leadership bolsters 
confidence within the state and provides effective control during the negotiation of the 
terms of investment with firms.  This process directly increases a state’s attraction to 
host multinational investment, implementing a virtuous cycle (Tarzi 1991: 169-71). 
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 Like with multinational firms, competition affects the bargaining power of states.  
Increased competition among firms escalates the bargaining power of states in 
investment negotiation because of the heightened desire of multinational firms to have 
an operational presence in that particular nation.  The power derived from multiple 
firms engaging in competition for investment opportunities gives states an upper hand 
to shop for the best possible investment package in terms of the direct benefits for the 
state.  These benefits involve increased volume of capital accounts and outlines of 
extensive economic and physical development projects (Tarzi 1991: 172-3).  The 
bargaining power is important to consider because of the tendency of the advantageous 
party to force the implementation of unequal agreements that may sow discord and 
erupt at a later period. 
Information and Transparency 
 After examining the incentives of both parties to engage in the facilitation of FDI, 
the importance of information transfer becomes clear.  Information is essential to firms 
and states in investment agreements.  From the initial proposal to the implementation 
of investment, both parties engaged in negotiations benefit by conveying their incentives 
and motivations to invest in order to protect and foster a rewarding investment. 
Information regards risk analysis on both sides of investment.  For firms, 
information consists of outlines of a state’s labor supply, economic policies, legislation, 
taxation, government spending and overall allocation of government resources.  For 
states, information consists of outlines of all corporate activities of firms that will be 
implemented within their economy, such as detailed business models, projected 
development assistance along with other recompenses to the state.  The more 
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information provided through various vehicles of transparency by both parties, the less 
uncertainty in investment. 
The availability of information, or transparency is an essential element of foreign 
investment.  The degree to which both parties are transparent has a significant effect on 
the probability of a firm to pursue investment opportunities.  According to my 
theoretical model, transparency increases foreign investment by acknowledging and 
alleviating uncertainties of risk to investors.  Transparent policies decrease investor risk 
by allowing investors to access and analyze accurate economic and political data of a 
potential host government.  
Firms initiating foreign investment require relevant information regarding 
potential host countries because of necessary strategic planning.  In an effort to 
effectively compose business strategies that maximize profitability through minimizing 
the cost of production, firms require necessary information about the potential host 
country’s domestic economy.  Firms can compile economic analyses of potential host 
nations from the information made available by the host nation, as posted through 
various governmental platforms.  Transparent policy aids multinational firms in the 
generation of risk analysis reports because they are able to fully evaluate the climate of 
their potential investment.  By providing multinational investors with full access to 
relevant legislation and economic policy, host nations show their initiative and 
willingness to comply with the terms of foreign investment by laying out the legal 
framework under which firms will invest.  
  Transparency also helps provide information that outlines governmental affairs 
and insight to how a particular nation conducts its business affairs.  The consequences 
are severe for a state to expropriate a foreign held asset because of its adverse 
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reputational costs.  Therefore, states with vehicles of transparency are less likely to 
expropriate foreign held assets because of the adverse reputational costs to future 
investors.  
States can outline the boundaries in which the foreign investment will function 
by providing firms with appropriate information regarding its political and economic 
atmosphere.  Multinationals benefit the host country’s domestic economy by consuming 
the products and resources of local producers and exposing them to new consumer 
bases, therefore, incentivizing states to be transparent and open to multinationals 
during investment negotiations.  States are enticed to showcase the prominent and 
inadequate facets of their domestic economy to firms because of the firm’s ability to 
potentially bolster the state’s economic development and profitability of domestic 
producers.  Developing states can further accelerate economic development by 
increasing their credibility by conveying what is scarce in their economy to investors.  By 
utilizing transparent means to inform multinational firms about the positive and 
negative components of its domestic economy, developing states can maximize the 
benefits of hosting foreign investment. 
 The availability of information is a major obstacle of both parties in foreign 
investment.  Firms will invest where information is available and plentiful.  My 
hypothesis is structured around my theory that transparency alleviates the information 
problem in investment; therefore, states with higher rates of transparency will receive 
increased FDI from multinational firms.  As long as a state is transparent, the regime 
type should not be a divisive factor in the decision to invest.  Transparency is driving 
investment alongside democracy, indicating that transparency serves as a separate 
variable when dissecting the relationship between transparency and democracy.  The 
	   	   J.	  Andrew	  Carter,	  Jr.	  
	   	   47	  
degree to which a state is transparent is independent of the degree to which it is or is not 
democratic.  Therefore, the type of government is not contingent in determining the 
level of informational transparency. 
Democracy & Transparency Are Not the Same 
 Previous literature states that democracies yield higher levels of transparency 
than nondemocratic regimes because of the accountability of elected officials (Hollyer et 
al., 2011).  While transparency is positively correlated with the presence of democracy2 
political scientist Daniel Kono (2006) argues that democratic governments are more 
likely to obscure policies that do not mirror popular opinion.  The contradictory 
arguments lead to the notion that democracy and transparency are not the same. 
Although transparency is a common byproduct of democracy, it is not solely 
dependent on the presence of democracy.  Transparency acts as a distinct conceptual 
variable in analyzing the allocation of foreign investment.  The degree to which a 
government regime is democratic and the extent in which that regime is transparent are 
not co-dependent.  Autocratic regimes can be transparent and democratic regimes can 
be obscure.  A noteworthy example is through the economic policy of Singapore, a very 
closed government regime that is known for its openness and frequent publishing of 
social and population census data, official audit reports of government agencies, election 
contributions and expenditures, national budget records as well as government loans 
and contracts (Article 19 2005: 62). 
Because a state is considered “democratic,” does not mean that the government is 
required to be open about their domestic economy.  Democracies can be equally, if not 
more obscure than autocratic states.  Through various back-door policies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Empirically	  represented	  in	  Appendices	  A	  &	  B	  
	   	   J.	  Andrew	  Carter,	  Jr.	  
	   	   48	  
democratically elected politicians have just as much incentive to withhold crucial market 
and economic information from their constituents and multinational firms to maintain 
electoral support.  For example, the developing state of Mongolia is considered 
democratic according to its score of 10 on Polity IV scale.  In terms of transparency, 
Mongolia ranks among the lower echelon of transparent states because of its mere 58% 
of reported statistics to international institutions according to the Hollyer et al. (2011) 
dataset on transparency. 
Previous scholars agree that democratic regimes yield higher levels of investment 
because of the implied transparency in democracy.  This finding implies that autocratic 
regimes are less transparent than their democratic counterparts.  Autocratic elites are 
just as capable of establishing and maintaining transparent economic policy as 
democratic regimes.  There are notable examples of developing, autocratic regimes 
exhibiting transparent economic policies with multinational firms, such as Belarus and 
Morocco.  From 1996 to 2007, Belarus scored -7 on the Polity IV scale, indicating the 
absence of democracy.  However, Belarus is considered transparent, reporting over 93% 
of economic statistics during the same time period. Morocco is another noteworthy 
example scored -6 according to Polity IV and reported an astonishing 99% of statistics 
from 1998 through 2007, rendering its status as transparent. 
In regards to the problems faced in investment, democratic regimes have a clear 
advantage in attracting investment over autocratic regimes because of their ability to 
alleviate the commitment problem.  Measures to alleviate the commitment and 
information problem increase the probability of investment through the reduction of 
investor risk.  Since autocratic regimes cannot singlehandedly counter the commitment 
problem because of the absence of democracy but they can be transparent, the presence 
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of transparency must have a bigger impact in autocratic regimes.  Therefore, the degree 
to which an autocratic state is transparent is more important in the eyes of investors 
than the degree to which a democratic regime is transparent. 
Concluding Statement and Hypotheses 
Evaluating the motivations of multinational firms and developing nations to 
engage in investment ventures and thoroughly examining the information problem 
provide adequate support for the framework of my research question: do developing 
states with increased levels of transparency attract more investment inflows?   
The insufficient explanation of how to alleviate the information problem provides 
me with the framework of my argument.  Transparency drives foreign investment in the 
developing world because of its ability to provide symmetrical information to both 
parties regarding each party’s preferences, therefore, alleviating the information 
problem in investment.  After taking into consideration the previous literature written 
on FDI, I have produced the following hypothesis: there is a positive correlation 
between increased inflows of foreign investment with the presence of transparent 
economic policies.  In other words, the more transparent a state, the more foreign 
investment inflows they will receive.   
My second hypothesis emerges from the ability of both democratic and autocratic 
states to be transparent.  Investor risk is relieved through the adoption of transparent 
vehicles in both types of regimes.  If democracy is acknowledged as the sole alleviator of 
the commitment problem, autocratic states are immediately disadvantaged in the 
competition for investment because they cannot overcome the commitment problem.  
However, autocratic regimes still receive investment flows.  If transparency is driving 
investment and can counter the information problem, transparency must have a greater 
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impact on the investment flows of developing autocratic states.  The presence of 
transparency is more beneficial to developing autocracies than that of developing 
democracies. 
Although both of the hypotheses presented in this thesis concern transparency, I 
do not claim that transparency is the sole prerequisite of investment.  Instead, I propose 
that transparency can better eliminate the informational uncertainty because of its 
ability to reduce risk by providing both parties with adequate information on different 
facets of the investment.  I will empirically demonstrate that transparent economic 
policies have a noteworthy effect on increasing the likelihood of investment apart from 
its relationship with democracy in developing nations around the world.  The next 
chapter details my research model, which will showcase the empirical analysis of both of 
the proposed hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
In this section, I will measure transparency, democracy and foreign investment 
through the analysis of transparency scores, the degree to which a nation is democratic 
as well as the fluctuations of foreign investment inflows.  My hypotheses and the 
correlation of my dependent variables can be formally evaluated through a quantitative 
analysis of ordinary least square regression in time series cross-sectional data in an 
effort to find a correlation between transparency and FDI inflows.  My index of statistics 
used in the evaluation of my hypotheses is restricted to information pertaining to 
developing countries, which consists of any nation not an active member of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
First, I will discuss my dependent and independent variables necessary to 
evaluate my hypotheses.  After, I will empirically evaluate the relationship between 
transparency and democracy as well as highlight their individual relationship with FDI.  
After, I will present the research model of both aforementioned hypotheses and 
showcase the regression results in order to explain the statistical significance of each 
variable.  I will conclude this chapter by discussing the findings of my empirical analysis 
in terms of my central theory. 
Description of Variables 
The dependent variable of this hypothesis consists of FDI inflows over the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of a particular country, represented as FDI/GDP.  GDP serves 
to normalize FDI flows.  Comparing FDI inflows to a state’s GDP aids in the formation 
of a common measurement between nations, relieving asymmetries in the sizes of 
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domestic economies around the world.  I deem FDI/GDP to be the best possible 
dependent variable in the research models of both hypotheses because of its ability to 
generate consistent and comparable data about various states. 
The independent variables consist of the lag dependent variable (β1Yt-1), the 
degree to which a state is democratic (β2EI Democracy), the degree to which a state is 
transparent (β3EI Transparency), gross domestic product per capita (β4EI GDP per 
capita), economic growth (β5EI Growth), population (β6EI Population), and standard 
error (Σt). 
 The lagged dependent variable is fundamental in both research models because I 
expect the current level of the dependent variable FDI/GDP to be heavily affected by its 
level in the previous year.  The lagged variable consists of FDI/GDP at t-1.  The lagged 
dependent variable also addresses concerns of autocorrelation. 
The degree to which a state is democratic is measured using the standard 21-
point Polity IV index.  The index, which includes all major and independent states 
around the globe, ranks each state based on trends in global governance.  The study 
measures the extent of executive recruitment, limitations of executive authority, and the 
legitimacy of political competition.  Ranging from -10 to 10, countries with a ranking 
between -10 to -6 are considered autocratic while countries that score +6 to +10 are 
considered to be democratic (Marshall 2013).  
Throughout my research, I came across various indices that empirically measure 
transparency such as that of Fry et al. (2000), which surveyed over 90 central banks 
from around the globe on a wide variety of topics such as methods of analysis, and 
institutional characteristics.  Even though the survey produced a general transparency 
index based on its findings, it is inadequate for use in this thesis due to its insufficient 
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pool of respondents.  Also, this index is not applicable to explain the transparency of the 
domestic economies of every developing nation; not every developing country has a 
central bank.  For example, the establishment of a central bank is prohibited under the 
Panamanian constitution (Warf 2002: 37). 
Instead, this thesis requires concrete data to analyze the extent to which 
developing states are transparent.  For my empirical analysis, I will use a study 
published by James R. Hollyer, Peter B. Rosendorff and James R. Vreeland (2011) that 
determines a country’s level of transparency based on the proportion of policy-relevant 
data distributed to international institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund.  Hollyer et al. examined 172 variables of the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and coded the presence of missing data among 181 
countries from 1960 to 2008.  This study is measured in a similar fashion as democracy 
in Polity IV.  The index is measured by the fraction of the 172 variables reported by a 
country in a given year.  A country that does not provide any data for the WDI, is given a 
score of zero, while countries that report statistics on all 172 variables receive a score of 1 
(Hollyer et al. 2011: 1197-8).  
The World Bank compiles data submitted by national statistical agencies as well 
as international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization.  The World Bank’s WDI index is a collection of over 800 sponsored and 
verified indicators on more than 150 different economies around the world.  The WDI 
index includes national statistics of individual states on agriculture, aid, climate, the 
economy, education, energy, debt, gender, health, poverty, trade, etc. and chronicles 
their fluctuations as far back as 1960.  For my thesis, I will utilize indicators of GDP per 
capita, population and growth.  The World Bank discloses the official statistics on GDP 
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per capita and population.  My growth variable, however, is expressed as a percentage of 
the current annual GDP growth minus the GDP from the previous year, divided by the 
GDP of the previous year. 
Hypothesis 1 – Transparency in Investment 
 
In order to statistically test my central theory that transparent, developing states 
receive increased foreign direct investment (FDI), I can utilize a time series cross-
sectional data analysis, which will determine statistical significance among variables.  
Since transparency can be empirically measured, I can analyze its impact on FDI inflows 
alongside the degree to which a state is democratic, population, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth rate. 
Research Model 
FDI/GDPEI = (β1Yt-1) EI + β2EI Democracy + β3EI Transparency + β4EI GDP per capita + 
β5EI Growth + β6EI Population + Σt 
Table 4.1: Hypothesis 1 Results 
 
Coefficientsa 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .033 .005  6.619 .000 
Polity IV .001 .000 .098 5.908 .000 
Transparency -.016 .006 -.047 -2.830 .005 
GDP per capita 1.820E-14 .000 .042 2.050 .040 
Population -3.238E-11 .000 -.075 -3.664 .000 
Growth .001 .000 .165 10.447 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: FDI/GDP 
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Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .194a .038 .036 .059 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Growth, Transparency, Population, Polity IV, GDP per capita 
 
The results of the OLS regression of the first hypothesis are showcased in Table 
4.1.  The “Sig.” column in the top graph indicates if there is statistical significance 
among variables (indicated by an alpha (α) level of 0.05).  According to the results, the 
degree to which a state is democratic, the growth rate of GDP, population are 
statistically significant.  For this hypothesis, however, I am mainly concerned with the 
transparency variable and its relevance to my dependent variable, FDI/GDP.  Based on 
the results, transparency is slightly significant.  In other words, the degree to which a 
state is transparent is empirically supported as a minor indicator of investment inflows 
behind the GDP growth rate, total population and the Polity IV score of a developing 
state. 
The R-square value indicated in the lower table represents the proportion of 
variance in the data that is explained by the model.  In other words, Polity IV, 
transparency, GDP per capita, population and rate of GDP growth explain 3.8% of the 
variation of FDI/GDP. 
Hypothesis 2 – Autocracies and Transparency 
I hypothesize that transparency is more beneficial to developing autocratic 
regimes because of their inability to overcome the commitment problem due to the 
absence of democracy.  Therefore, transparency should have a greater impact on FDI 
inflows in autocratic regimes and reduce investor risk at a higher rate than transparent 
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democracies.  Similar to the first hypothesis, I will conduct a time series cross-sectional 
analysis on developing democratic and autocratic nations to empirically evaluate my 
second hypothesis.  
However, this hypothesis requires additional coding of variables.  It is necessary 
isolate autocratic and democratic states in order to properly test this hypothesis.  States 
with a Polity IV score less than -0.01 will be considered autocratic and greater than 0.01 
will be considered democratic.  I characterize each polity by a scalar Δ = [1,0] where 1 
indicates the presence of democracy and 0 indicates autocracy.  Through this method of 
coding, I can simplify the Polity IV score, which will aid in showcasing whether or not 
there is an increased dependency on transparency in developing autocratic regimes. 
Research Model 
FDI/GDPEI = (β1Yt-1) EI + + β2EI Transparency + β3EI GDP per capita + β4EI Growth + β5EI 
Population + Σt  + β6EI Δ 
Table 4.2: Hypothesis 2 Results (Democracies)  
 
Coefficientsa,b 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .115 .013  9.039 .000 
Transparency -.095 .015 -.155 -6.510 .000 
GDP per capita 1.184E-14 .000 .013 .470 .638 
Population -4.844E-11 .000 -.060 -2.120 .034 
Growth .001 .000 .073 3.113 .002 
a. Dependent Variable: FDI/GDP 
b. Selecting only cases for which democracy =  1 
 
	   	   J.	  Andrew	  Carter,	  Jr.	  
	   	   57	  
The empirical results of the second hypothesis displayed in Table 4.2, indicate 
statistical significance among the variables of growth and transparency in developing 
democracies.   According to the unstandardized coefficient “B” column, the analysis 
indicates a negative effect of transparency on FDI.  According to the table, increased 
transparency in developing democratic regimes is correlated with decreased investment 
inflows. 
Table 4.3: Hypothesis 2 Results (Autocracies) 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .023 .006  4.105 .000 
Transparency -.006 .007 -.017 -.892 .372 
GDP per capita 1.734E-14 .000 .035 1.357 .175 
Population -2.640E-11 .000 -.051 -1.959 .050 
Growth .001 .000 .152 8.085 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: FDI/GDP 
b. Selecting only cases for which democracy =  0 
 
The second regression, Table 4.3 shows the results of the regression for 
developing autocratic regimes.  According to the table, growth is sole significant 
variable.  Transparency has the least significance of all the variables.  Similar to Table 
4.2, the unstandardized coefficient B indicates a negative effect of transparency on FDI 
in developing autocratic regimes.  Although both transparency coefficients in the second 
hypothesis are negative, the negative effect of transparency is smaller for autocracies 
than it is for democracies.  While the empirical analysis indicates that transparency 
decreases investment in developing regimes, the fact that transparency reduces FDI 
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more in developing democracies than in developing autocracies serves as sufficient 
support for my second hypothesis. 
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CHPATER 5 
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS & ASSESSMENT 
 
This thesis attempted to explain the ability of transparency to reduce investor risk 
and fully alleviate the informational problem of investment.  The research offered 
throughout this thesis serves the purpose of determining the underlying prerequisites of 
the allocation of FDI.  The analysis of key variables sought to explain the role of 
transparency to determine of which states will receive foreign investment.  
Existing literature on FDI and its role in the developing world examines the 
potential externalities of investment, the measures taken by both firms and states to 
protect their interests and the underlying uncertainties faced by both entities during 
negotiation.  However, the international political economy is anarchic and there are no 
mechanisms to enforce commitments and obtain information, which results in an 
informational and commitment problem. 
After a formal review of the previous scholarship on the commitment and 
informational problem in investment and the role of democracy in each of the problems, 
my theory materialized.  If democracy produces less risk by directly addressing both 
problems through political representation and accountability, why do autocratic regimes 
still receive investment inflows?   
I proposed an alternative solution to the informational problem in investment 
ventures: transparency.  Because transparency is not the same as democracy and 
autocratic regimes receive investment flows, democracy cannot singlehandedly alleviate 
the problems in investment.  I have identified a clear and evident gap in existing 
scholarship on FDI and its relationship with vehicles of transparency.  
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I presented two hypotheses in this thesis: 1) transparency is driving foreign 
investment in the developing world and 2) transparency is more vital to autocratic 
regimes because of their inability to counter the commitment problem.  Vehicles of 
transparency, via access-to-information legislation or the explicit disclosure of economic 
statistics are vital in countering the informational problem presented through the 
negotiation of foreign direct investment between multinational firms and developing 
nations.   
The key insight from my theoretical model is that asymmetries in information 
inhibit both parties from profiting off the positive externalities that stem from foreign 
investment opportunities.  However, through transparency vehicles, the incentives to 
pursue investment and its underlying uncertainties can be properly identified and 
acknowledged. 
My empirical analysis tested the significance of transparency in the allocation of 
FDI around the globe, measuring the extent to which a state is democratic and 
transparent and its subsequent effects on the FDI inflows in terms of its gross domestic 
product (GDP).  Because the byproducts of democracy are recognized as the most 
efficient means to ensure commitments, I also tested whether or not evident vehicles of 
transparency within autocratic regimes are more important in alleviating investor risk 
as compared to democratic regimes. 
The statistical analysis presented in chapter four of this thesis concluded that the 
degree of transparency is not contingent on the presence of democracy in a particular 
developing state.  The findings indicate that developing autocracies and democracies 
have similar advantages in the competition for investment. 
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In regard to my first hypothesis, the results of the regression show that 
transparency does, in fact, play a minor role in determining the allocation of foreign 
investment in the developing world.  However, transparency was less significant than 
the GDP growth rate, population and the degree to which a state is democratic.  My 
prediction of increased investment flows to transparent, developing states is supported 
by the linear regression models my first hypotheses. 
The findings of the empirical analysis also support my second hypothesis 
regarding the increased impact of transparency in developing autocratic regimes.  After 
isolating developing democracies and autocracies, I was able to test the significance of 
transparency in determining FDI in both types of regimes.  The results indicated that 
transparency has a negative correlation with FDI.  However, transparency decreases 
FDI more in democratic regimes, implying that transparency is more beneficial to 
autocratic regimes. 
In summation, the presentation of my research indicates the importance of FDI 
inflows to developing countries.  This indicates the importance of the initial negotiation 
of terms without proper mechanisms to ensure commitment and transfer accurate and 
symmetric information.  By examining the relationship of transparency and FDI in the 
developing world, as outlined throughout the body of this thesis, I attempted to predict 
which states will receive FDI in an effort to decipher a trend throughout the 
international political economy. 
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Appendix A: Regime Type vs. Transparency 
 
 
(Source: Polity IV and Hollyer et al. 2011) 
 
 
Appendix A shows the level of transparency as compared to the type of regime.  
This graph indicates a low correlation between democracy and transparency.  On 
average, non-democratic regimes (nations with a Polity score between -7 and -10) are 
slightly less transparent than democratic regimes (nations with a Polity score between 
+7 and +10) in terms of the amount of information reported to international 
institutions.  
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Appendix B: Polity IV vs. Transparency Score 
 
 
 
 Polity IV 
Code 
Mean Transparency 
Score 
Non-democratic Regime   0 0.695 
Democratic Regime 1 0.811 
TOTAL  0.754 
 
(Source: Polity IV and Hollyer et al. 2011) 
 
 
Appendix B compares the mean transparency score between democratic and 
non-democratic regimes.  Democratic regimes, on average, scored higher than 
autocratic regimes in terms of the ratio of reported data to international institutions.  
The difference between the mean values is a mere 0.116, indicating no statistical 
difference between the mean transparency scores of non-democratic and democratic 
regimes. 
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Appendix C: FDI Flows & Regime Type in 2007 
 
 
 
(Source: World Bank 2014, Polity IV) 
  
The graph indicated in Appendix C shows the FDI inflows based on the Polity 
IV score of developing states in 2007.  From the graph, foreign investment flows appear 
to be equally distributed among democratic and non-democratic regimes. 
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Appendix D: FDI Flows & Transparency in 2007 
 
 
 
(Source: World Bank 2014, Hollyer et al. 2011) 
 
  
Appendix D highlights the investment inflows as a component of GDP based on 
the transparency score of both developed and developing nations in 2007.  From the 
graph, the majority of FDI is concentrated in states that scored above 0.6 in the 
transparency index, indicating higher investment flows in transparent regimes. 	  
